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Abstract 
An assumption of sincere voting for one's most preferred candidate is frequently invoked in models 
of electoral competition in which the elected legislature consists of more than a single candidate or 
party. Voters, however, have preferences over policy outcomes -- which are determined by the ex 
post elected legislature -- and not over candidates per se. This observation provokes the following 
question. For what methods of translating election results into legislative policy outcomes is sincere 
voting rational in the legislative election? This paper provides the answer. One of the principal 
implications is that for sincerity to be rational, there necessarily exists a candidate for office whose 
electoral platform is the final legislative outcome, whether or not that candidate is elected to the 
legislature. 
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Introduction 
Two papers published recently in the Review have developed formal models of multi-candidate 
electoral competition in which the elected legislature consists of more than a single candidate or party 
(Greenberg and Weber, 1985; Greenberg and Shepsle, 1987). Greenberg and Weber analyse the 
fixed-standard method. In this scheme, there is a prespecified number of votes, m, such that the 
legislature consists of all those candidates winning at least m votes in the election. Greenberg and 
Shepsle examine the fixed-number method. Here, the size of the legislature, K, is predetermined, 
and these seats go to the candidates with the K-highest number of votes. Both papers share the 
following four assumptions: 
(A.l )  Candidates are identified with possible outcomes; 
(A.2) The set of possible outcomes is isomorphic to a compact subset of the real line; 
(A. 3) Individual voters have single-peaked preferences over the set of possible outcomes; 
(A.4) Given a set of proposed alternatives, each individual votes for his or her most preferred 
alternative in that set. 
For our purposes, the first three assumptions are harmless; the last is not. (A. 3) implies that 
individuals care about outcomes and not candidates per se, but the mechanism by which final 
outcomes are generated from any elected legislature is left unspecified. To be fair, Greenberg and 
Weber informally defend (A.4) by assuming "that all of the elected candidates form a committee (or 
the cabinet) with each having one vote and decisions are made according to some majority rule" 
(p.698). Although this is a well-specified outcome function, it nevertheless turns out (as we shall 
see) to be problematic for their model. Greenberg and Shepsle offer no defense at all. 
By (A.3), individuals are interested in legislative outcomes and not in legislative composition for 
its own sake. If individuals are presumed rational, then voting behavior will be directed toward 
promoting their most favored outcome. Call any mechanism which specifies a final policy outcome, 
conditional on the policy positions of the elected candidates and, possibly, on individuals' electoral 
voting behavior, a legislative outcome function (LOP). Then it is natural to ask: "Given individual 
voters are rational and assuming (A.1) - (A. 3), for what class of legislative outcome functions does 
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(A.4) necessarily constitute rational behavior?". In the next section, this question is made precise 
and answered. 
The implications of the answer for the models of Greenberg et.al. -- and others which assume 
sincere voting over lists of candidates for multi-member legislatures (e.g. Sugden, 1984) -- are 
striking. The main result (loosely stated) is as follows. Suppose the election scheme is defined for 
all possible sets of candidates, nontrivial (i.e. not all candidates running for office necessarily get 
elected), and anonymous (i.e. does not depend on the names of candidates) . (The fixed-standard 
and the fixed-number schemes, for example, satisfy these criteria.) Then there exists no anonymous 
LOF such that sincere voting constitutes rational behavior at the election stage. I 
In other words, for the sincere voting assumption to be justified on rationality grounds, 
legislative outcomes must depend on the entire list of candidate platforms and electoral votes, and 
not simply on the platforms of the candidates elected to office. In particular, there must exist a 
candidate for office, c, whose electoral platform is the final legislative outcome whether or not c is 
elected to the legislature. Thus the LOF described by Greenberg and Weber is insufficient to defend 
the assumption of sincere voting successfully. 
Model and Results 
Let N = { l, . . . , n} be the finite set of voters, and let the set of possible outcomes be X. 
Assume X is a closed interval [(A.2)]. Let U be  the set of symmetric and strictly single-peaked 
preference orderings (i.e. no flat spots) on X [(A.3)]. For any Ui e U, let xi= argmax.xUi(-): xi
is individual i's ideal point in X. A preference profile for N can then be summarized by a list x = 
(xi)N e xn. Individuals' preferences are common knowledge. Let C = {y1, . . .  ,yc}e C denote an
arbitrary set of candidates, where C is the set of finite subsets of X [(A. 1)]. For any i e N and set 
of candidates C, i's (pure) voting strategy is a function: 
ai : X x C """' C,
where O'i(xi, C) = Yk means individual i, with ideal point xi in X, casts his vote for candidate Yk e
C. 
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Definition: Individual i e N votes sincerely with respect to e if and only if: 
cri(xi, e) = Yk => -[3 Yk'e C\{yk} I Ui(Yk') > Ui(Yk)].
Let cri
T(xi, e) denote i's sincere voting strategy with respect toe.
Let cr(x, e) = ( cr 1(x1 • e), . .. ,O'n (xn, e)) denote an arbitrary list of voter strategies (given the
profile x and the set e), and let aT(x, e) = (a1 
T(x1, C), . . . ,O'n 
T(xn, C)). Where there is no
danger of ambiguity, the dependency of O' etc. on x and C, will be supressed. 
An election rule for e is a mapping, 
Ee: en --+ 2e\0.
The interpretation here is that an election rule takes the respective votes for candidates, and defines 
which candidates are elected. Let vk( O') = I { i e N I O'i = Yk} I. Then, for example, under the
fixed-standard method, Ee= EC
FS, studied in Greenberg and Weber,
EeFS(cr) = {Yk e e I vk(O');;:: m > O}.
And the fixed-number method, Ee= EcFN, defined in Greenberg and Shepsle is,
EeFN(a) = {yk e CI vk(O') S vk•(O') for at most K-1 candidates Yk'e C\{yk} }.
An election rule Ee is nontrivial if and only if3a e en, 3yk e e such that vk(O') > 0 and Yk �
Ee(O'). If VC, Va, Yk E Ec(O') implies vk(O') > 0, then say that Ee is E-efficient. If Ee is 
symmetric with respect to voters, then Ee is anonymous. Let I. = {Ee I Ee is nontrivial, E-efficient 
and anonymous}. Both EeFS (with m > 1) and EeFN (with K < n) are members of I,.
Call any set e* e 2e\0 determined via an election rule Ee· a legislature. 
Given a set e, a legislative outcome function for C (LOF) is a mapping, 
A.e: (2e\0) x en --+ x.
For every possible legislature elected from C, the LOF defines the legislative policy outcome. This 
outcome is not restricted a priori to lie in C. For example, the final outcome may be some weighted 
average of the elected candidates' platforms. And notice that we allow the LOF to depend on voter 
strategies as well as on the positions of the elected set of candidates. This, for example, permits 
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successful candidates' vote-shares to matter in legislative decision-making. Of course, the LOF may 
be constant across er e en for any given C* e 2C\0.
Say A.e is anonymous if it is symmetric with respect to both candidates and voters. A.e is 
L-efficient if 'VC* e 2e\0, 'Vere en, A.e(e*, er) e co. (e*), where co.(H) is the convex hull of H
(a subset ofR). Let A= {A.c I A.c is L-efficient and anonymous}. In the current setting, restricting 
attention to A is natural (especially in view of (A. 1) ). For example, the simple majoritarian rule 
suggested by Greenberg and Weber is, 
A.e(C*' er) = median { Yk I Yk E e*}'
which is clearly L-efficient and anonymous. 
Given a finite set of candidates C in X, a LOF A.o an election rule Ee. and a vector of voting 
strategies er, the final legislative outcome is given by A.e(Ee(er), er) e X. Define the mapping, 
Ye:en�x
by setting Ye( er)= A.e(Ee(er), er), 'Vere en. If Ee e I. and Ace A then Ye is anonymous (i.e.
symmetric with respect to voters), and efficient (i.e. Ye(cr) = y implies y e co.(C)). 
For any individual i, Ui(Y) is i's payoff from outcome ye X. Given e and Yo define i's
indirect utility by, 
ui(cr) = Ui(Ye(er)), i e N.
Write er_i = (er1, .. ., eri-1• eri+l• ··· , ern).
Definition: The sincere voting strategy eriT is weakly dominant under Ye for i iff,
ui(eri
T• er_i) � ui(eri, er_i), 'v'eri '#er?, 'v'er_i·
If for all profiles x e xn, eri
T (xi, e) is weakly dominant under Ye for all individuals i e N, say that
Ye is straightforward. 
With the above framework, the question posed in the Introduction can be stated precisely. 
Given an arbitrary set of candidates C and an election rule Ee e I,, for what subset A(Ee) of A is 
the following true: 
5 
A. e A(Ee) ¢:::>Ye is straightforward and YeO = A.e(Ee(·), ·)?
A first step toward the answer is given by Proposition 1. The argument for this result, given in the 
Appendix, is due to Kim Border. 
Proposition 1: Assume Ee e I., A.e e A, and Ye(·)= A.e(Ee(·), ·). Suppose Ye is
straightforward. Then, Va(x, e) E en, Ye(a(x, e)) E e.
Suppose Ye is defined as in Proposition 1. Then the result says that if Ye is straightforward,
we can without loss of generality write, Ye : en � e. In other words, under anonymity and
efficiency, for sincere voting [(A.4)] to be rational for all individuals at the electoral stage, the LOF 
must select an election platform offered by one of the candidates. So, for example, either bargaining 
between elected candidates, leading to a compromise policy outcome lying between some pair of 
electoral platforms, must be ruled out or sincere voting is not rational. 
In view of Proposition 1, we can now apply a theorem of Moulin [see also Border and Jordan 
(1983)]. For the framework developed above, the result is:2
Theorem [Moulin, 1980]: Assume Ee e I,, A.e e A, and Ye(·)= A.e(£c(·), ·). Then the
following two statements are equivalent: 
(1) Ye is straightforward;
(2) 3 (n-1) real numbers ac1, ... , aC n-l e e u {-oo, +co} such that,Va(x, e) e en,
Ye(a(x, e)) = median{a1, ... , O'n, acl• ... , acn-ll·
Therefore, if Ye is defined as in Proposition 1 and is straightforward, then the composition of the
election rule and the LOF must reduce to a rule based on an order statistic. 
Typically, election rules and legislative outcome functions are defined independently of the list 
of candidates competing for legislative office. This is certainly true for those rules studied by 
Greenberg et.al., and for many others. The only case (of which I am aware) in which such 
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independence might be violated is the practice of using plurality voting for pairwise contests, but 
some other method (e.g. Borda rule) in multi-candidate contests. (Of course, the composition of 
any set of candidates for legislative office will depend on which particular election rules etc. are in 
force.) Appropriate notions of candidate-independence for election rules and LOFs can be defined 
implicitly through Ye·
Definition: Let Ye : e
n � X, and let C* be an arbitrary subset of C. Then,
Ye is £*-independent if and only if, "if(x, e) e x
n x C*, Ye(cr(x, e)) = y(cr(x, e)).
Proposition 2: Assume 'Vee C: Ee e L, "-e e A, YeO = "-e<ee(·), ·), and Ye is
straightforward. lfye is C*-independent for some C* in C, then 3Co = {c1, ... , cn-1 }in R u
{ -oo, +oo} such that: 
(1) e E C* => e � ce0 fl R),
(2) "if(x, e) e xn x C*, Ye(cr(x, e)) = median{cr1, ... , crn, c1, ... , cn- ll·
Proof: By Proposition 1 and Moulin's Theorem, for each e, 3 aC 1, ... , aC n-l e e u { -oo, +oo}
such that, "ifcr(x, e) e en, Ye(cr(x, e)) = median{cr1, ... , crn, a
c1, ... , acn-ll· By
C*-independence, the (n-1) real numbers, ac1, ... , aC n- l• must be independent of e e C*. The
result follows. I I 
This result says that the only election rules and LOFs that are both candidate-independent on C* and 
lead to rational sincere voting, must involve a (possibly empty) set of "phantom candidates" who 
always compete and who are endowed with at least one "vote", irrespective of the voting strategies 
of individuals in N. For example, suppose ICo fl RI = 1. Then under the assumptions of 
Proposition 2, there must exist an alternative y0 e X -- the status quo, for example -- such that (1)
any admissible set of candidates e in an election includes y 0, and (2) y 0 is IlQ1 the final legislative
outcome if and only if there is a distinct candidate Yk in e such that all individuals prefer Yk to y 0.
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In general, however, admissible sets of candidates do not include such predetermined and 
especially favored alternatives. This observation motivates the main result of the paper, a 
straightforward consequence of Proposition 2. 
Corollary 1: Assume Ye(·)= A.c(Ec(·), ·) and,'v'C e C, Ee e L, A.c e A. Then Ye cannot be
both straightforward and C-independent (i.e. C*-independent with C* = C). 
Proof: By Proposition 2, if ye is both straightforward and C-independent, then Con R = 0.
Therefore, ct e { -oo, +oo}, all t = 1, ... , n-1. Since Ee is nontrivial, 3(x, C) e xn x C such that
IEc(cr(x, C))I = IC*I < ICI. By Proposition l, J..c(Ec(·), ·) e C. In particular, because Ac is
L-efficient, A.c(C*, cr(x, C)) e C*. However, 'v'Ec e L we can choose (x, C) so that:
median{ cr1, ... , an, c1, ... , cn-1} e C\C*.
But by Proposition 2, Ye(·)= median{cr1, ... , O'n, c1, ... , cn-1}: a contradiction. II
So, in answer to the original question, Proposition 2 shows that the subset of LOFs, A(Ec), for 
which it is true that, 
A. e A(Ec) <=>'Ye is straightforward and Ye(·)= A.c(EcO, ·) ,
is empty when Ee e L, A.c e A. Given anonymity, efficiency, and candidate-independence, this
result implies that if sincere voting is rational at the election stage, then either the election rule must 
be trivial (i.e.'v'C e C, 'v'cr e en, Ec(cr) = {Yk e C I  vk(cr) > O}), or the LOF must be defined on
the entire list of candidate platforms, C, and not only on the positions of the ex post elected 
candidates, C*. Hence, if the election rule is nontrivial and sincere voting is rational, it is possible, 
as claimed in the Introduction, for the final policy outcome to be the electoral platform of a candidate 
who is not elected to the legislature. (Example 2, in the next section, illustrates this possibility.) 
In view of these observations, Corollary 1 can alternatively be expressed as a possibility result.
For any C e CC, define Ye* : en � X, and suppose Ye* is anonymous (i.e. symmetric with respect
to voters), and efficient (i.e. yC( cr) = y implies y e co.(C)). Then, applying earlier results:
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Corollary 2: [Ye* straightforward and C-independent]� 3 an order statistic p on N such that,
'v'(x, C) E xn x CC, 
ui(p)(Yk) > ui(p)(Yk·), V'yk' e C\{yk} -==> Yk = Yc*(cr(x, C)),
where i(p) e N is the individual with the pth·-ranked ideal point.
Under the premise of Corollary 2 there are no predetermined candidates such as the status quo. 
In this case (given anonymity, efficiency, and C-independence), if sincere voting is invariably a 
rational strategy for individuals, there must exist some individual i* -- identified by the relative
position of his ideal point xi* (e.g. the median voter) -- such that if any candidate Yk adopts Yk =
xi* as her electoral platform, then xi* will necessarily be the final policy outcome, whether or not Yk
is elected to the legislature. Once xi* is adopted by some candidate for office then, ceteris paribus,
all voters are indifferent over all possible compositions of the legislature. So for other candidates to 
have an incentive to enter the election, their payoffs must depend on factors other than influencing 
the legislative outcome. Specifically, being an elected member of the legislature per se must be of 
value. 
Two Examples 
The following examples illustrate the main points of the previous discussion. Let N = { 1, ... , 
7} and X = [0, 1]. Assume the election rule is the fixed-number method, ec = ecFN, with the size
of the legislature K set equal to 2. The LOF is: the final outcome is a weighted average of the two 
elected candidates' positions, with the weights being given by relative vote shares. This LOF is 
both L-efficient and anonymous. Assume individuals have symmetric single-peaked preferences on 
X with ideal points described by x = (x 1 • . . . , x7 ).
Example 1: x= (0, 1/5, 3Sno, 7 /10, 4/5, 9/10, 1), and C = { 1/5, 4/5}. In the terminology of 
Greeenberg and Shepsle, C constitutes a 2-equilibrium under sincere voting in which i = 1, 2 vote 
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for Y l• and i = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 vote for Y2· So C1 * = C1 here. The final outcome is (2n)-(1/5) +
(5n)-(4/5) = 44no. However, given other individuals' vote sincerely, if i = 3 votes strategically for
y 1, the final outcome is 3tt>no. This clearly makes 3 better off. 3
Example 2: x = (0, 1/5, 3/10, 19/35, 7/10, 4/5, 1), and C = { 1/5, 4/5, 19/35}. Under sincere
voting, i = 1, 2, 3 vote for y 1 • i = 5, 6, 7 vote for Y2• and y3 receives 4's vote. Since there can
only be two candidates elected, C* = {YI, Y2L as in Example 1. (If Yl and Y2 alone were
candidates, this would again constitute a 2-equilibrium.) The final outcome under the LOF is: 
(3nH1/5) + (3n)-(4/5) = 3n. However, given others' voting strategies, if individual 4 votes
strategically for candidate Y2 then the final outcome is 19/35. And this yields a higher payoff to 4
than sincere voting. 
While the LOF described is relatively special , it is easy to check that for Example 2, unless 
A.c((y 1 • y2), ·) = x4, individual 4 will never wish to vote sincerely for Y3 (given sincere voting by
the remaining individuals). The same conclusion holds if the election rule ecFN is replaced by the
fixed-standard rule, Ee = ecFS, with the standard m = 3. Thus the example illustrates why
Greenberg's and Weber's defense of (A.4) is not quite sufficient. For the defense, they invoke the 
LOF which selects the median of the elected candidates' positions. With the two-candidate 
legislature C2* = {y1, Y2} � C, any alternative y* e [y1, Y2l is a median outcome: but only a final
outcome of "-cC-. ·) = y* = x4 can support the assumption of sincere voting at the electoral stage.
Conclusion 
This note argues against the assumption of sincere voting in models of multi-member legislative 
elections. Instead, the complete legislative game -- election rule and legislative outcome function --
should first be explicitly defined, and then (rational) individuals' voting behavior deduced. The use 
of sincere voting in eguilibrium may be a property of the game. 
From a normative perspective, requiring any legislative game to be structured to induce sincere 
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voting in equilibrium is considerably less demanding than requiring it to insure sincere voting 
everywhere. And recent work in implementation theory shows that multi-stage games -- such as the 
legislative election games discussed here -- are powerful instruments for generating truthful 
(equilibrium) behavior by players in the game (cf. Moore and Repullo, 1986). Nevertheless, the 
results reported above say that such structures for legislative election models must have the order 
statistic property described in Moulin's theorem (1980). 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: First observe that since the domain of Ye is finite, so is the range of 
Ye· Since Ye is efficient, the result is trivial if 1e1 = 1. Let 1e1�2 and suppose the proposition is
false. Then 3x e xn such that Ye(crT(x, · )) = z e X\e. Because 1e1�2 and ee and A.e are
'-efficient, 3y1, Y2 e e, 3x' e xn such that crT(x', · ) = (y2, Y2· ... , Y2), and (1) Yl < z < Y2 =
Ye(crT(x', ·)), (2) -3yk e C\{y1, Y2} such that Yk e (YI, Y2). (Note that the sincere strategy
profile at x' does not entail that all individuals share a common ideal point in X.) Since A.e is 
L-efficient, crT(x, ·) must be such that cri
T{xi, ·) � Y2 for some i e N, and cri
T(xi, · ) � Yl for some
i e N. Let N(x, Y1) = {i e NI cri
T(xi,-) = Yl} and N(x, Y2) = {i e NI cri
T(xi,-) = Y2} . Without
loss of generality, assume N(x, Y1) u N(x, Y2) = N, and relabel N (if necessary) so that N(x, Y1)
= { 1, ... , h}, h < n. Let X1 = [Yl· [Y1 +y2]/2), and X2 = ([Yl +y2]/2, Y2l· Then we can pick x =
... , h, define the preference profile: 
xh-r = (x1, x2, ... , xh-r-1• xh-f' xh-r+l'• ... , xn'), where xi' e X2 
Vi.
Then xh = x, and Lim.r--+ h (x
h-r) = x'. Since Ye(crT(x, · )) = z and Ye(crT(x', ·)) = y2 > z, 3r*,
0< r* � h, such that Ye(crT(xh-r
*+ 1, ·)) = z and Ye(cr T(xh-r*, ·)) = z0 e X\{z}. Since A.e is 
L-efficient, z0 � Y2· Suppose z
0 < z, and let xn' = Y2 e X2. Then, by anonymity of Ye,
Ye«Yl• cr_n 
T(xh-r*, ·))) = Ye(crT(xh-r*+l, ·)) = z > zo.
Since n's preferences are strictly single-peaked and xn' = Y2•
un(Yl, cr_n 
T(xh-r*, ·)) > un<Y2· cr_n 
T(xh-r*, ·)) = un(crT(xh-r
*, · ))
which contradicts straightforwardness of Ye· Hence, z0 e (z, Y2l· Suppose z � [Y1 +y2]/2 and
choose xh-r*+ 1' = xj' e (z, [z+z
0]/2), a subset of X2. By anonymity,
Ye((Y1· cr_j 
T(xh-r*, · ))) = Ye(crT(xh-r
*+ 1, · )) = z < zo.
And by single-peakedness,
uj(Yl, cr_jT(xh-r
*, ·)) > un(Y2· cr_jT(xh-r
*, ·)) = uj(crT(xh-r
*, ·)), 
contradicting the straightforwardness of ye: so z < [y1+y2]/2. But then, by symmetry, we can
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repeat the previous argument, mutatis mutandis, to conclude z < [y1 +y2]/2 implies 'Ye is not
straightforward: do this by picking x1 = Y I · xi e X1, all i = 1, ... , h, and an appropriate sequence
of preference profiles (xs)S�§. such that x' = x
O and Lim.S�§. (x
S) = x. This then yields a
contradiction of the original supposition that 3x e xn such that Ye( cr T (x, ·)) = z e X\e. II 
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Footnotes 
*Much of this paper is a result of the efforts of John Ledyard to understand what I was trying to say
about the problem. I am extremely grateful for his help, and for his insistence that I look for a 
theorem and not simply a set of examples. I am also grateful to Kim Border for providing a proof 
for one of the results. Despite their input, I retain all responsibility for any remaining errors and 
ambiguities. 
1. Relaxing the assumption of anonymity does little to ameliorate the difficulties, discussed below, 
with assuming (A.4) generally. 
2. In Moulin (1980), the theorem is stated and proved assuming C = R. However, as Moulin 
remarks in footnote 2 (p.445), the result carries over directly to the case of C being a compact subset
ofR. 
3. For a similar example, see Ursprung (1980). 
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